COMMANDERS DIGEST

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

HYDROFOIL TESTS—Plainview, the world's largest hydrofoil vessel lifts its hull from Puget Sound, Washington, waters, during tests by the builder. When on foils, the craft is capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots. The vessel is a major item in the Navy's broad investigation of hydrofoil vessels.

Discrimination in Housing Against Law, Says Clifford

The 1968 Civil Rights Act makes housing discrimination unlawful on Jan. 1, 1969. On June 17, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling giving the Defense Department additional means to end housing discrimination against any serviceman—and said to end it promptly.

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford stated June 20 that, "It is against Federal law today, right now, for any landlord to discriminate because of the color of a man's skin."

Beginning August 1, he said, no member of the Armed Forces stationed at a base in the U.S. will be authorized to enter into a new lease or rental arrangement at an apartment or trailer court near his base if the owner follows discriminatory policy in leasing to servicemen.

Mr. Clifford also said procedures will be established "as quickly as possible" to make legal advice available to any serviceman who experiences housing discrimination.

This legal help will include counseling the individual, if he so wishes, on his rights to bring a law suit against a discriminatory landlord under the 1866 law recently upheld by the Supreme Court.

A year ago in July the Defense Department began an intensive campaign to eliminate housing discrimination against military men and their

(Continued on Page 3)

Sec. Clifford Urges Rapid Development Of Sentinel System

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford believes the time has come to get the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system off the drawing boards and into actual development.

At his June 20 press conference, the secretary noted in addition to other reasons, "It's also my view that if the Soviets are developing an ABM system, and we know they are developing it, and we know that they are deploying it, I believe we are in a better posture to reach agreement with them on an ultimate step toward disarming if we also go about the deployment of a system.

"I think our negotiations over the past decades would indicate that this is the better position for us to be in if we hope to achieve some type of resolution of this problem with the Soviets."

Among the reasons why the U.S. should deploy the Sentinel, Secretary Clifford said, "it constitutes and will constitute a defense against the Chinese system.

"I attach significant importance to this, because in the years that lie ahead, I believe we should have a defense against the Chinese system other than just a massive retaliatory attack.

"I believe that we are in a stronger posture if we have this kind of defense so that we can't be blackmailed or forced into a certain position for fear of the type of attack that China could launch."

He said establishment of the present Sentinel system will be useful in the protection of our offensive system, adding, "Although, of course, as you know, it will not prevent a mas-

(Continued on Page 6)

New Civilian Employee Pay Rates

Annual Salaries for Federal Civilian Employees in General Schedule (GS) Category, Effective in July 1968.

Grade	Annual rates and steps									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS–1	$3,889	$4,019	$4,149	$4,279	$4,408	$4,538	$4,668	$4,798	$4,928	$5,057
GS–2	4,231	4,372	4,513	4,655	4,796	4,937	5,078	5,219	5,360	5,501
GS–3	4,600	4,753	4,907	5,060	5,214	5,367	5,521	5,674	5,828	5,981
GS–4	5,145	5,316	5,487	5,658	5,829	6,000	6,171	6,342	6,513	6,684
GS–5	5,732	5,924	6,115	6,307	6,498	6,690	6,881	7,073	7,265	7,456
GS–6	6,321	6,532	6,743	6,955	7,166	7,377	7,588	7,799	8,010	8,221
GS–7	6,981	7,214	7,447	7,680	7,913	8,146	8,379	8,612	8,845	9,078
GS–8	7,699	7,956	8,213	8,470	8,727	8,984	9,241	9,498	9,755	10,012
GS–9	8,462	8,744	9,026	9,308	9,590	9,872	10,154	10,436	10,718	11,000
GS–10	9,297	9,607	9,917	10,227	10,537	10,847	11,157	11,467	11,777	12,087
GS–11	10,203	10,543	10,883	11,223	11,563	11,903	12,243	12,583	12,923	13,263
GS–12	12,174	12,580	12,986	13,392	13,798	14,204	14,610	15,016	15,422	15,828
GS–13	14,409	14,889	15,369	15,849	16,329	16,809	17,289	17,769	18,249	18,729
GS–14	16,946	17,511	18,076	18,641	19,206	19,771	20,336	20,901	21,466	22,031
GS–15	19,780	20,439	21,098	21,757	22,416	23,075	23,734	24,393	25,052	25,711
GS–16	22,835	23,596	24,357	25,118	25,879	26,640	27,401	*28,162	*28,923	.....
GS–17	26,264	27,139	*28,014	*28,889	*29,764	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS–18	*30,239	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

*The salary for employees at these rates is limited by section 216 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 to the rate for level V of the Executive Schedule (as of the effective date of this salary adjustment, $28,000).

Air Force Begins New SEA Assignment Program for Pilots

Air Force has instituted a program that will initially identify about 3,000 additional pilots for assignment to Southeast Asia.

The program, called Palace Cobra, systematically withdraws pilots from stateside commands for assignment to SEA, and supports the Air Force objective "to delay involuntary second tours in SEA for as long as possible."

Officials said pilots identified should receive word sometime during July.

Air Force said experience in the right weapon system is the scarce commodity in SEA, and without altering the present course and methods of assignment selection, second tours could be required for some tactical fighter and helicopter pilots by the end of calendar year 1968. Palace Cobra is designed to delay this necessity.

Here's how Palace Cobra will work:

• Each stateside command has been tasked to identify a specific number of SEA eligible pilots, based on pilot qualifications and the command's portion of the total pilots eligible for SEA assignment. The number identified equals the known withdrawals expected for each CONUS command during a one year period.

• Pilots identified by their CONUS command will be placed in Palace Cobra freeze status according to eligibility order for SEA assignment. This means volunteers for SEA can expect early identification and there should be less delay between the time a pilot volunteers and the time selected for duty in SEA. The reassignment of those in Palace Cobra freeze is restricted to SEA duty required a pilot on flying status.

Officials said when an identified pilot is assigned to SEA or becomes ineligible for SEA assignment, he will be immediately replaced in freeze status by another SEA eligible pilot.

According to Palace Cobra procedures, each month CONUS commands will select a specific number of pilots from their Palace Cobra resource and advise Air Force that these pilots are available to fill SEA requirements. This will occur about four to seven months before the requirement month and will be used as the date of selection for SEA assignment (Assignment Selection Date according to AFM 36-11).

Pilots will be advised that they have been reported to Air Force for SEA assignment and, therefore, will have maximum notice of pending SEA assignment. Air Force will match Palace Cobra availables along with other availables against SEA requirements considering previous experience and personal preferences.

Reassignment to SEA will usually occur in the month of availability but may be in a month later than the availability month. Notice of specific SEA assignment will be received about three to four months before relocation month.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

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JCS Chairman Appraises Vietnam Military Situation

Newspaper editors received a top level appraisal of our military situation in Vietnam June 24 from Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"While personally we may all survive the querulous corrections of our would-be mentors, I do not believe that a balanced military appraisal of the course of events in Vietnam has even emerged, let alone survived," Gen. Wheeler told the New York Society of Newspaper Editors.

Gen. Wheeler said he understood "full well" the complex character of the war in Southeast Asia. But, he said, he did not agree that it was the most complex war in which we have ever been engaged; "that pre-eminence I accord to the American Civil War—the most traumatic experience this Republic has endured."

He said he wished to make it clear that "while I recognize the many important forces at play, I am convinced that the military outcome in Southeast Asia is fundamental to the nature of the settlement which will someday be reached."

The General then defined war as he understands it: "War is a political act; it is the employment of military force to achieve a political objective. Put another way, war is violence organized and utilized to destroy the capability and will of a hostile state to pursue a course of action inimical to national interests.

"The political objective established by our government to be gained in Southeast Asia is simple and limited—indeed, the most limited war objective of which I have knowledge. It is, as the President reminded us on the 31st of March, 'to bring about a recognition in Hanoi that its objective—taking over the South by force—could not be achieved.'

"Implicit in my definition of war is the thesis that war is not a passive act; it must be dynamic. That is, a war cannot be conducted defensively; strategically, it must be prosecuted offensively if the war effort is to be successful."

Gen. Wheeler said our limited political objective has established the following policy guidelines:

1—We seek to avoid widening the war.

2—We have no intention of invading North Vietnam.

3—We do not seek the overthrow of the government of North Vietnam.

4—We are guided by the principles set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

"In consonance with these guidelines," Gen. Wheeler said, "our war effort in South Vietnam is a strategic defensive, although it is conducted tactically in a major way by offensive operations. In contrast with our operations in South Vietnam, our air and naval campaign against North Vietnam is a strategic offensive."

Explaining, Gen. Wheeler said the difference is this: "In South Vietnam the enemy can control—at a cost—the type and level of combat activity and, hence, the degree of destruction and number of casualties. The contrary is true in North Vietnam; there we have the strategic initiative, and it is we, not the enemy, who can control the combat situation."

He said Gen. Giap had spelled out Hanoi's objectives in major policy addresses in September and again in October of last year. These objectives are:

1—To protect NVN.

2—To overthrow the present government of SVN and to seize its apparatus.

3—To unite all of Vietnam under Communist control.

Gen. Wheeler pointed out that the war came to pass when our objective—causing Hanoi to recognize that they could not take over the South by force—was directly challenged by Hanoi's twin aims of overthrowing the government of SVN and uniting all of Vietnam under Communist control.

Gen. Wheeler gave these thoughts on Vietnam:

1—The U.S. Armed Forces in South Vietnam remain unbeaten and unbeatable. The enemy has lost whatever chance he had of taking over South Vietnam by military force.

2—Our forces have achieved an unbroken string of victories which, in the aggregate, is something new in our military history. They won while they were learning. There were no Bladensburgs or Bull Runs.

3—The combat effectiveness of the ARVN has improved steadily over the past few years.

4—Much hard fighting lies ahead. The NVA/VC will fight for headlines, as much as for military purposes, during the months ahead. No one can have more reasons than the person occupying my position to want an honorable end to the fighting; but if our efforts toward a peaceful settlement are to succeed, we must continue to convince the enemy that they are not going to achieve their objectives by military force and its psychological by-products.

5—Despite the torrents of words and pictures that have come from Vietnam, this war remains the least understood in our history. Americans, as they more fully understand the magnificent record of our armed forces in Vietnam, will accord these young men that full measure of respect and honor which is their due . . ."

Discrimination

(Continued from Page 1)

families in apartments and trailer courts near military installations.

Reporting on the accomplishments of the campaign to eliminate housing discrimination, Mr. Clifford said. "In July 1967 only 61 per cent of these rental units were open to all servicemen, regardless of race and color. Now 83 per cent are open to all members of the Armed Forces." This is a gain of 247,000 open housing units.

He said he was "gratified by the progress in the last 12 months, but unfortunately there are still some landlords who discriminate on the basis of color against men who wear the uniform of their country. This is an intolerable injustice," he said.

A CHOICE: SECURITY OR ISOLATIONISM

For the first time since the early 1950's, the foreign policy we have pursued since the end of the war is facing a fundamental challenge. The issues in the debate are familiar to all of us.

The debate is not really concerned with the past, present, and future of the hostilities in Vietnam. It is addressed to the fact that we are involved in world politics and no longer live as we did in the 19th century, isolated and safe in a system of power maintained by others. The real issue we are debating is whether we continue to carry responsibilities . . . with the help of Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries who may wish to join us in regional efforts for peace, or whether we try once again to retreat into the world of the past, a world which isn't there and cannot be recreated.

The facts of life in the 20th century, and the nature of our civilization, require us to pursue the foreign policy which has been developed by our four Presidents since 1945.

The changing map of world power in this century makes it necessary for us—for the first time in our history—to play a leading part in seeking to build a secure and stable system of world order.

The old system is gone, destroyed in the aftermath of two World Wars. A new one has not yet been established. The European states which organized the balance of power in the 19th century are no longer capable of accomplishing that goal. The Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan are states on a new scale of power.

"Normalcy" Vs. Coexistence

After the First World War we repudiated President Wilson and sought to return to a "normalcy" that we refused to believe had gone forever. In the 1930's we followed an inward-looking isolationism that placed our own vital interest in mortal peril. Our internal debate raged until the moment when the enemy's attack mocked our irresolution.

The postwar administration of President Truman provides a happier parallel for the present debate. Like President Johnson, he had the courage not to run away from an unpopular war, whatever the political cost to himself. He laid down what has been our basic foreign policy ever since: the policy of coexistence. America wanted to live in peace within a reasonably stable world of broad horizons, a world in which we and our friends could seek the blessings of freedom and progress. We had no desire to launch military attacks against Communist systems, but we could not tolerate Communist aggression.

What we sought was Communist acceptance of the idea that force could not be used to change the boundaries of the two systems, a principle we upheld in supporting the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran, Greece, Turkey, and Korea and in preventing the absorption of Berlin. That, in broad terms, was the meaning of the famous Truman doctrine, announced in response to Soviet designs on Greece and Turkey.

Following that doctrine, successive American Presidents faced down Communist aggression time and time again. This principle is the essence of our position in Vietnam. On each occasion, we have made it perfectly clear that we were not trying to destroy the Communists in their own countries but only helping others to resist their aggression into the non-Communist world.

Peacekeeping And Aid

One half of President Truman's policy is symbolized by the Truman Doctrine, the other by the Marshall Plan and the Point 4 program. These were not "giveaway" programs as their shortsighted critics so often called them, but were designed to help other people back on their feet so that they could look after their own affairs.

With our help at a critical moment, the Western Europeans have made themselves more stable and prosperous than at any time in their history. No one talks any more about Western Europe "going Communist." Today the Western Europeans contribute a major share to Atlantic defense through NATO and give large quantities of aid to developing countries around the world.

We look forward to the Europeans taking a greater role in world affairs outside Europe itself. We are pleased by the increasing influence exerted in Asia by the Japanese, whose prosperity has made them the world's third largest economy.

In short, in the developed parts of the free world—in Europe and in Japan—our policy of peacekeeping and aid has on the whole been a success.

But as we have witnessed relative success arrive in one area, we have been faced by a growing challenge in another —in the whole "third world" of developing countries, many only recently freed from centuries of colonial rule.

We have assisted these peoples of the third world both with military power to shield them against aggression, and with aid to prime the process of their economic development. There has been real progress in many parts of this third world.

Impressive Steps

In Latin America, many countries have made impressive steps toward modernity. In the Middle East, Turkey, Israel, Tunisia, and Iran have shown dramatic improvements. So, farther East, have such countries as Pakistan, Thailand, the Republic of China, and South Korea.

But there is no point in comforting ourselves by looking only at the bright spots. There is a tremendous job to be done in many parts of the world before peoples can achieve stable political systems and throw off the poverty and despotism they have known for centuries.

There is going to be local turmoil in many places for a long time to come.

This would be true even if there were no Communists. It is ridiculous to see them behind all the troubles in the world, but it is equally ridiculous to pretend that they do not exist. In most of the troubled areas of the world they are active forces, exploiting confusion and seeking opportunities to extend their own brutal and dreary system.

Nowhere have the Communists taken the offensive more openly than in Southeast Asia. Mindful of the rebuff the free world dealt the North Korean attempt at direct aggression in 1950, the Communists in Southeast Asia are trying a newer and more sophisticated form of aggression. They call it the "war of national liberation."

The nations of Southeast Asia are still weak, militarily and economically. Should the development of these countries be disrupted, the risk that they would be taken over—the risk, that is, of a Communist-dominated Southeast Asia —would increase radically, and thus radically increase the risk of wider change in the equilibrium of force, fear, and influence in the world.

A Hostile Asia

If this happened we would be confronted, in our "small world" of supersonic jet aircraft and missiles, with the threat of a hostile Asia quite similar to the threat which we perceived 30 years ago as a menace to our own security. Such a condition in Southeast Asia would have certain consequences in Korea, in Japan, and in the islands near Asia.

To enhance their efforts at economic development, and in defense, the nations of Southeast Asia have formed a number of useful regional organizations. But, both militarily and economically, even their combined power could not match that of a crusading China and her zealous disciples. What does right it, what give them the confidence to pursue their own efforts, is America's demonstrated willingness to support Asian governments who are making their own self-development and their own self-defense efforts in the face of Communist insurgency.

As long as Asians remain convinced of American willingness to stand behind them and help them, the small nations of Asia can continue to face up to Hanoi and Peking, deal with Communist insurgency at home, and develop in the ways of their own choosing.

This is what is at stake in Vietnam. In theory, there may be better places to fight than Vietnam; in fact, we have no alternative.

Vietnam's War

In any country with a history of chaos such as that of Vietnam in the 20th century, there are bound to be many disaffected people, deeply established habits of violence, and a great deal of difficulty in establishing a central government based on consent. The Communists have recognized this from the beginning and are skillful in linking their political efforts to the exploitation of popular grievances. Because of these grievances, and through the use of terror . . . the Communists have succeeded in building an infrastructure with roots buried in the soil of South Vietnam.

So long as this infrastructure remains, the war in Vietnam will not be won.

This fact is the key to understanding the war in Vietnam, a war which is as much political as it is military.

We must find the will and the means to meet our responsibilities both at home and abroad if we are to be true to ourselves, our friends, and the interests of the generations that follow us. That is the basic policy of this administration; that is where the President has been leading us.

**Excerpts from a recent address by Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.*

Johnson Signs Bills On Absentee Voting

President Johnson has signed two bills designed to extend the voting franchise for overseas American citizens.

The bills—S. 1581 and S. 2884—are amendments to the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955. That act is a statute that encourages the states to provide absentee ballot facilities for the following four categories of voters and their spouses and dependents: members of the armed forces; members of the Merchant Marine; overseas civilian employees of the government, and members of religious or welfare groups assisting servicemen.

The provisions of the Voting Assistance Act apply to all elections—federal, state, or local. Under it, the states are encouraged to provide a simplified system of absentee registration and voting, including uniform procedures for ballot applications

(Continued on Page 7)

PARTING HANDSHAKE—Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., departing Commanding General of U.S. Army Vietnam, bids farewell to Lt. Gen. Myung Shin Chae, Commanding General, Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam. Gen. Palmer leaves the 350,000-man command to assume duties as Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Sentinel ABM System Development

(Continued from Page 1)

sive attack from a nation that launches one. It can prove to be of importance in protecting our retaliation."

Another reason, the secretary noted, "It is possible—we would hope not probably—that some time there could be an accidental launching.

"Too, it seems to me that not sufficient attention has been given to the fact that another nation could possibly over the next few years acquire some nuclear capability, even though minor in nature.

"I believe this type of defensive system would prove to be very valuable to us under those circumstances."

As for the Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile schedule, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Paul C. Warnke said in a letter, June 11, 1968, "Last September we estimated that the Chinese would conduct an ICBM test-launch by the end of 1967, which would have allowed them to deploy an initial ICBM force by the early 1970s and a significant number of operational ICBMs by the mid-1970s. However, the Chinese have not yet test-launched an ICBM and we would not expect one until late this year at the earliest."

Regarding deterrence of a Chinese attack, Secretary Warnke said, "The prime deterrent against Chinese nuclear aggression will remain for the foreseeable future our overwhelming strategic retaliatory capability, including our bombers, ICBMs and Polaris submarines."

In a related area, Secretary Clifford at his press conference said, "I want to be comfortable in my mind that we maintain a greater nuclear power and strength than the Soviet Union does. I think this is not based only on the number of ICBM's or the nature of the hardened or softened sites, I think it includes the types of warheads that are involved. I think it includes our Polaris fleet. I think it includes our bomber capability and deliverability, and I believe we must maintain this nuclear superiority, and as long as I am here, I shall work toward that end."

In an area regarding this country's newest tactical fighter, the F-111A, Secretary Clifford noted that a careful series of tests and examinations has been conducted, and one mechanism, a valve, proved to be defective.

He said, "In a number of instances in which they had trouble with the plane, this defective part was found. Now they are correcting that. Since they have corrected that one defective part, they have not had any difficulty with the flights with the plane that have been made in this country.

"I believe within the period of the next few weeks flights will be resumed first as training flights in Southeast Asia, and then after that in the absence of any new developments, I would expect the plane to return to active military service in Southeast Asia."

He added, "I am not saying that this could be the only problem. There could be other problems, but we are comfortable that we have found the main reason for the difficulty."

Legislation to Amend UCMJ Before Congress

Legislation to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice "to insure or allow uniformity in the treatment of offenders sentenced to confinement" is now before Congress.

In a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, USA, The Provost Marshal General of the Army, said the principal purpose of the bill (H.R. 5783) is "to attain uniformity among the armed forces in the administration of military correctional facilities and the treatment of persons sentenced to confinement under the UCMJ.

General Turner's statement, released June 21, said the provisions of titles 10, 14, and 37 of the UCMJ as they now apply to each of the armed forces are not compatible in content or terminology that will allow or insure uniform treatment of offenders sentenced to confinement.

General Turner, as representative for the Defense Department, said he supported H.R. 5783 and declared the bill would accomplish its purpose in the following manner:

1—It would repeal the several sections—3661, 3662, 3663, 7215, 8662, and 8663 of title 10 and section 426 of title 37, and amend section 509 of title 14, United States Code, as they now individually pertain to confinement facilities and procedures of the several departments; and

2—It would provide the statutory framework for uniform administration of military correctional facilities and uniform treatment of personnel of all departments confined pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Such treatment will encompass the education, training, rehabilitation, and welfare of offenders; the remission or suspension of unexecuted parts of sentences and the restoration to active duty or reenlistment of selected offenders; and the parole of offenders.

General Turner then gave an illustration showing why the provisions of titles 10, 14 and 37 as they now apply to each of the armed forces are not compatible in content or terminology: "For example," he said, "the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Transportation, the latter in respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a part of the Navy, do not have the authority presently granted the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a parole system for persons under their jurisdiction who are confined in a military correctional facility.

"There is also disparity," he continued, "among the services with respect to statutory authority for the restoration to duty of selected offenders. These disparate conditions are the result of separate and individual enactments pertaining to each of the armed forces over a period of years."

Absentee Voting

(Continued from Page 6)

and adequate time for ballots to be transmitted.

To expedite the ballot applications, the Act provides for a standard Federal Postcard Application Form, with free air mail handling. To prevent fraud, the application requires a sworn statement giving the identity and domestic address of the applicant as well as a sworn statement that the applicant is not voting elsewhere.

The first bill signed by President Johnson—S. 1581—amends the Voting Assistance Act to encourage the states to allow members of the armed forces and their dependents residing on military reservations to register and vote in the state where the reservation is located. At the present time, all but three of the states refuse to allow such military personnel to vote as residents of the state.

In addition, S. 1581 urges the states to authorize certain overseas federal officials to administer oaths in connection with the absentee registration and voting requirements of state law. At the present time, only a narrow category of federal officials is authorized to administer such oaths under the Voting Assistance Act.

MODERN TECHNIQUES—Col. Charles E. Walker, center, Commanding Officer, 10th Marines, explains a radar chronograph to Adm. Ephraim P. Holmes, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, during his visit to Camp Lejeune, N.C. The radar chronograph measures muzzle velocity of enemy weapons being fired, enabling our weapons of the same muzzle velocity to return fire in concentrated groups. Looking on (behind Adm. Holmes) is Lt. Gen. Richard G. Weede, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.

Katzenbach Reviews Foreign Policy Problems

The complex and often misunderstood problems of our foreign policy have been reviewed at a Foreign Policy Conference in Knoxville, Tenn., by Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

In his address, "Prevalent Misconceptions About World Affairs," he declared "prevalent misconceptions or oversimplifications about world affairs —notions that at one time may have contained some truth but which, with the passage of events, have become damaging and misleading."

A prime case, he said, is that of foreign aid, which since World War II has been a major tool of our foreign policy.

Today's foreign aid program is not a major factor in our budgetary difficulties, he said, nor does it contribute heavily to our balance of payments problem. The President's aid appropriation request this year, both for economic and military aid, is just about $3 billion—out of a total Federal budget of $170 billion.

"In fact," he said, "we are not first but fifth among the industrial nations in the percentage of our gross national product devoted to foreign aid. The idea, heard often nowadays, that it is possible to make a choice between our overseas commitments and spending for domestic needs is another myth. Certainly priorities can be established. Certainly particular aspects of our overseas commitments can be altered.

"We can give less aid to this country or less support to that one. But the idea that what we cut overseas can somehow automatically be added to domestic spending is, of course, both practically and politically naive.

"To allow chaos to build up abroad would not help our poor at home. To weaken our defense in an area where other powers would be ready to threaten our security, our trade, and our interests in peace would bring no satisfaction whatsoever to those interested in eliminating domestic poverty.

Mr. Katzenbach said there is "a lingering myth of American omnipotence—an overconfidence in our ability to influence the events of a turbulent and changing world.

"Let us face facts," he said. "Our ability to determine how other governments will act—even those friendly to us and dependent on our help—is limited. We are, in each case, dealing with sovereign nations which, like us, have their own domestic disputes, their own legislatures, their own public opinion.

"The leader of a foreign country may agree completely that what we want him to do makes sense. But there will be times when he must ignore our advice because to take it would mean that he would be out of office.

"It is often argued," he said, "that if a country allied with us will not do as we want, we should cut off or reduce our aid. But such a step almost always has the reverse effect from that intended. It may turn a nation against us, as Egypt turned against us after we withheld aid for the Aswan Dam.

"Even if there is no drastic or immediate reaction, the long-range results are bound to be self-defeating. Our objective of fostering peaceful evolution and economic development is hardly served by actions which increase the chances of conflict or slow down the process of development.

"Our aims in the Middle East, for example, are simple enough. We would like the Arab-Israeli dispute to be settled fairly and peacefully. Yet our influence is limited, not only by the emotions and hatreds which dominate the area but by the role played by other powers.

"Despite the fact that we were providing aid to both Israel and Jordan, we were unable—even with the most strenuous effort—to prevent the June war. We had sent arms to the area, but in moderate quantities. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had provided over 2 billion dollars' worth of military equipment, while various other countries had sold arms to both sides.

"After the war, hoping that a peaceful settlement might finally grow out of the ravages of war, we suspended all arms shipments to both Israel and the Arab states. But others have failed to match our restraint."

SILVER STAR—Maj. Robert C. Nelson, an F-105 Thunderchief pilot with the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing in Vietnam, receives the Silver Star from Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

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
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